University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2011

The Urbanization fo Chinese Citizenship: A Case Study of
Shanghai and Suzhou
Ryan James Parsons

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Parsons, Ryan James, "The Urbanization fo Chinese Citizenship: A Case Study of Shanghai and Suzhou"
(2011). Honors Theses. 2389.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2389

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE URBANIZATION OF CHINESE CITIZENSHIP: A CASE STUDY OF
SHANGHAI AND SUZHOU

by
Ryan J. Parsons

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for completion of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

Oxford, Mississippi

May 2011

Advigor: Dr. Jo hud Howard
>

G LP
Reader: Dr. Gang Guo

ek @:
Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen

© Ryan J. Parsons
2011

Citations adhere to the Chicago style.

Acknowledgments and Dedication
| owe an immense debt of gratitude to my educators, foremost my advisor, Dr. Joshua Howard,
for his tireless advice and direction; as well as to my third reader, Dr. Gang Guo; my academic
adviser, Dr. William Schenck; and to Dr. Kees Gispen.
1am particularly indebted to my Chinese teachers, Dr. Yi Lin, Dr. Zhu Yongping, Dr. Wang Jiajia,

Li Han-chia, Mo Li, Li Ming, and several dozen inquisitive taxi drivers, all of whom cultivated the
language skills that made this thesis possible.

| am thankful for the fellow members of my Croft cohort for providing advice, friendship, and
distractions from homework and this thesis over the past four years.
Finally, | am deeply appreciative to my parents and all of my brothers, who, despite their
minimal interest in the rural-to-urban labor flows discussed in these pages, have provided

constant support. This thesis is dedicated to them.

Table of Contents
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

canes 1
Research QUESTION vo... cccscsecsesesssessseseseecsesrsescecsesesesssenssecnsneesesesesesssnssssesacsesesanensesnsssseseseananeaaseneseses
ess 5
The Meaning Of Citizenship........ccccccsessescsscscescescsscsesscsesscesssssseeecseceeseeansassseesaesseeeseesssensasersnasieeeanesnes
The Importance Of the Study ......ccccccccccssssecssssesccscescsecssseesebesssseeessassesscsesesessessecesesenserssaeneesecsensusessestees 9

Methodology, Data, and Preliminary Hypotheses... cccccsesssecesescscseseesesetensterssesetssssecssnensnenseeeseess 11
CHAPTER II: THE HUKOU SYSTEM AND CHINA'S RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE

The Hukou System of Population Registration ...cccssccscsssesessesseseseesesseteeesteseenserseeessteeersecceneersnseeess 15

The Effects of Population Registration on the Rural-Urban Divide .......sscsssesssesssesrenserseneeeereerssesereeeens 18
CHAPTER Ill: THE POLICIES OF SHANGHAI AND SUZHOU

General Stipulations of the HUKOU SYStOM .....cccssesccesseseeesssrsssesscsssssesesesesssenscsssseneescseseesssseenssisnasensesens 29
Municipal Policies Of Shanghai.....c..cccccscseccssscsseseeseeeeesessesssscescssseseecsesesseeesietsseessassseseseeseecaeensneneseees 30
Municipal Policies Of SUZNOU .....ccccsesecseeteeseeesstetsesesesesscscseesscessssesessssesenesassssenessesensesassseeeasnaneecenensesees 33
AMAYSIS ...ceeeeessceseeeessecescscessseesesesecssseeesesasseesscacsssssssscscsesessesessaesenssscssseuesessesendvarsseevesassesennasaasesssensesgseges 36
CHAPTER IV: MIGRANT EDUCATION IN SHANGHAI AND SUZHOU

The Legal Status and Basic Conditions of “Unregistered Household” SChOOIS........:sscssesesseeeereereetenes 41
Migrant Education in Shanghai .....c.cccccsssssseessssesesssssneessseetenseeenssscessnensssensvenessseseenesssessenaneasenaeensnsseses 43
Migrant Education in SUZHOU... cscscsssescsesesesesesseseeeeeeeeseaneneteenesseensesseneseseneneneseneneneasnanesnaaneesesseetees 46
AMAlySiS .....s.cccccsessscsessesesenessssecescsescsesesesseescesuseecanseeseesneenensasisisssseesssasacesseseaeseseeesenenenensnenanesuaneneneerseeesey 49
AND SUZHOU
OF MIGRANTS IN SHANGHAI
PERCEPTION
eee
CHAPTER
ee eee
eee
eeV: MEDIA

oe

Media Perception in Shanghai ......ccscssssssssessesereeeesesessenesnesesnensssssessisassvesessssseensseasanensnensanseassenssesesssteey 53
Media Perception in SUZNOU.....ccesesssesescesesesseseseesesnesssneseeeeseanennsassiesssvsesseessensessneseaneneenearaneananeacanesseseess 59
AMalySiS ...ccsssscsesessesesesscsesesssssscsescscsuesesvesesescsuesesesenenssssucanassesessaucsssuesscssssenscusueecusensaseusssesesssessessseesseeneess 62
CHAPTER VI
Differences between Shanghai and SUZHOU ......csssccsssesenetetseseenensnscstersssesesseresenensenenecseaenserssneanenegees 65

Implications Of the StUAY ....c.sssesssessseesseesneersnecsseesssessnsesssesssecssecssnecsnecssnecentasceussassscossssssssossenssssensntesss 66
Prospects for the FUtUIE ......sssessesssesssecseesneesneesesseessicssusssscsssessscssscenecenecsnecueeninecnsennecansesecsuscsenessssesensssysss 67

Chapter I: Introduction
In 1986, Chinese journalists Zhang Xinxin and Sang Ye published an interview with Zhang
Baojian, a native of the countryside near Shanghai who had migrated to Beijing to work as a
tailor. The interview detailed the lack of opportunities for Zhang in his hometown and the
ordeals of starting a new life as a migrant worker. The experience of Zhang Baojian, who at the
time of the interview had become a moderately wealthy businessman in Beijing, foreshadowed
the social upheaval soon to be caused by the migration of several hundred million more rural
residents to China’s rapidly growing cities. Though Zhang’s younger compatriots face the similar
problems of underemployment and lack of opportunity in their hometowns, both the political
and social fabric of China have changed significantly in the twenty years since Zhang established
himself as a tailor in Beijing. This thesis will address how these changes have taken place, and
will discuss the implications that a new social and political atmosphere has for the role of
migrant workers in Chinese society.’

Research Question

The most significant demographic consequence of China’s economic reforms has been
the massive movement of people from China’s countryside to its urban areas. The scale of this
migration is unprecedented; official government statistics assert that the size of the migrant
population had reached over 147 million people in 2005; news sources suggest this number

* Zhang, Xinxin and Sang Ye, Chinese Profiles, Beijing, PRC: Panda Books (1986), 101.

could be as high as 240 million today. ? According to the 2000 census, approximately half of
these migrants remained within their home counties. * The remainder had left their home
counties, and in the case of 50 million migrants, left their home provinces. Of all the segments
of China’s migrant population, the relative size of interprovincial migrants has grown most
rapidly in recent years.’ The wave of human migration that has resulted has been termed the
“floating population” because of the inability of its members to change their permanent
registered residence (hukou).° The floating population includes people who have met three
conditions: they have left the administrative region in which they are registered residents for a
period longer than six months, they have not acquired a new hukou or altered their old one,

and, and least theoretically, they continue to “float.”®

Although China’s hukou system has precedents dating back to ancient household
registration systems and the baojia system that existed in late imperial China, the hukou system
as it exists today is a vestige of the Maoist-era planned economy.’ The central government
sought to restrict urbanization for both ideological and economic reasons by assigning people a
hukou identifying them with their place of birth, usually based on their mother’s registered

? National Bureau of Statistics, "Communiqué on Major Data of 1 percent National Population Sample Survey in
2005," 16 March 2006, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 12 September 2010,

<http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_ en_deta
il.jsp?searchword=floating+population&channelid=9528&record=2> .
Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (2006), 129.

* Ibid, 130.
° The Chinese phrase is liudong renkou (fit) AF). Though liudong is often translated simply as “floating,” Michael
Dutton notes that this translation does not convey the disparaging connotation of the Chinese term. The
etymological origins of the expression liudong suggest not only a lack of place, but also chaotic movement and the

assumption of criminality. See: Michael Dutton, Streetlife China, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1998),
61.

® DorothyJ Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the
Market, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (1999), 15.

Ibid, 28.

hukou.® The motivations for these restrictions originated in the central government's broader
economic goals for China. Marxist ideology views urbanization as a consequence of capitalism;
the logical corollary that appeared during the decades following the Communist Revolution in
China under Chairman Mao was that restricting urbanization would restrict the spread of
capitalism. * More pragmatically, maintaining a tight control over population movement
allowed the central government to coordinate industrialization efforts and regulate the
agricultural communes that had been established earlier. Housing and work assignments were
restricted to the area listed on one’s hukou, and one’s hukou could only be changed through
marriage or other exceptional circumstances. The implicit assumption at the outset of the
hukou system’s implementation was that people would spend their whole lives in their
birthplace.’° Between 1958 and 1982 these agricultural communes formed the basis of rural
residency in the pre-reform era. Peasants collectively contributed to farm labor within their
registered localities, and in return received basic health care and education. Since 1982, when
communes were dismantled, rural residents have been required to pay for these benefits

themselves.”?
Since the inception of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and open up” policies, the demographic
shift that began in the 1980s has completely changed the landscape of labor in China and has
given rise to a host of new social issues. While rural-to-urban migrants were able to seek
employment in construction and as entrepreneurs in the private sector, they continue to be
denied access to the cities’ relatively generous social welfare programs and other public
* Ibid, 16.
* Ibid 33.

*° Li Zhang, "Spatiality and Urban Citizenship in Late Socialist China," Public Culture, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2002: 314.
11

.

Ibid, 293.

services. As a result, significant portions of China’s urban population have been excluded from
the urban sphere of society; they can live and work in the city, but they have not necessarily
received any form of social security, been able to enroll their children in public schools without

paying exorbitant fees, or benefited from various health care programs.’ Given the significant
increase in opportunities for mobility in the reform era, the disparity between the treatment of
“official” and “unofficial” city residents is an increasingly visible issue.

This thesis examines to what extent the distinction between urban and rural residents
still exists by addressing three aspects of urban citizenship in two Chinese cities, Shanghai and
Suzhou. First, it will analyze the legal restrictions and protections afforded to rural migrants in
these two cities. Second, it will attempt to determine how well these policies are being
enforced vis-a-vis the protection of migrants’ rights, using education policy as a case study.
Finally, it will analyze current media debates in Shanghai and Suzhou surrounding the
citizenship rights of rural workers in these two cities to plot the trajectory of the evolution of
Chinese citizenship. This thesis hypothesizes that the status of migrants in both of these cities
has improved since the early 1990s, particularly in terms of education policy enforcement. Their
heightened status is connected to the rise of grassroots movements and increased public
awareness as market forces continue to draw migrants to urban areas. The different
backgrounds of migrants to these two cities have also had an effect on the role of market forces.
Migrants from the most recent wave to these cities have arrived with higher levels of education
and more advanced skills, and are involved in more technologically complex industries.’ These

Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China, New York: St. Martin's Press (1999), 154.

* Mallee, Hein,"Migration, Hukou, and Resistance in Reform China," In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict, and
Resistance, by Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, New York: Routledge (2010) 85.
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migrants form a critical part of these advanced sectors of the Shanghai and Suzhou economy.
The data shows that because of their increased importance in these cities’ economic
development, they have more leverage in influencing policy than earlier waves of migrants.

The Meaning of Citizenship

Central to the discussion of the status of rural migrants in China is defining what, exactly,

constitutes citizenship. The definition of citizenship that applies to most Western societies, i.e.,
one is a citizen of a country by virtue of birth or legal naturalization, does not adequately
account for the obvious inequality between the legal statuses of China’s urban and rural
residents, nor can it accommodate the persistence of this inequality as rural residents migrate
to cities. This inequity suggests that Chinese citizenship should be viewed as a spectrum.
Though a basic package of rights is extended to everyone that is called a citizen by the Chinese
state, a blanket definition of citizenship in China is essentially meaningless because of these
inequalities. China’s registered rural residents enjoy so few benefits compared to registered
urbanites that they belong to a separate class. Although the different social classes that exist in
China may have been justified on economic grounds when domestic migration was strictly
controlled, the persistence of this inequality in an era of frequent migration raises questions
about the meaning of Chinese citizenship.
This progressive idea of citizenship was advanced by sociologist T.H. Marshall in the
1950s. In its simplest version, Marshall’s view defines citizenship as a status that is “bestowed

on those who are full members of a community.”** Though Marshall rejects the notion that

4TH. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," Inequality and Society, Jeff Manza, & Michael Sauder, New York:
W.W. Norton and Co. (2009), 150.

there is some universal package of rights that must be granted before full citizenship is attained,
he stresses the importance of equality across society. Marshall sees citizenship as a progression
from civil rights to political rights and finally to social rights.’° It is readily apparent that China’s
rural and urban residents exist at different points along this progression.

Sociologist Bryan S. Turner extends this view of citizenship by analyzing the role of labor
in obtaining citizenship. In his view, the social aspect of citizenship is a product of participation
in the labor market. Increased integration into the modern economy comes with entitlements
unavailable to rural workers; welfare, insurance, health care, and retirement benefits are all
amenities of a post-agriculture economic sector.*° As a result of these entitlements, those who
enjoy social citizenship become more involved in different forms of civil society, such as workrelated organizations and unions.”’ This understanding of the social aspect of citizenship is
particularly troubling for China’s rural residents. As the urban economy grows at a faster pace
than the rural economy, China’s urban residents are able to move further along the progression
towards a Marshallian view of full citizenship while rural residents lag behind. Moreover, the
entitlement programs that Turner associates with participation in the labor force are granted
according to one’s hukou. Thus, even migrant workers who integrate themselves into the urban
economy are unable to attain the benefits associated with entrance into the urban work force
because of their permanent identity as rural residents.
Angus Stewart, a sociologist at the London School of Economics, puts the question of
Chinese citizenship in a broader context by discussing two expansive concepts of citizenship.

* Ibid, 151.
. Bryan S. Turner, “The Erosion of Citizenship,” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 52, No. 2, (June 2001): 192.
+
Ibid, 193.
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The first, state citizenship, is defined by a legal association with a nation-state and can be
further divided based on the degree of welfare entitlements discussed by Marshall and Turner.
The second conception of citizenship, more familiar to Western societies, stresses political
participation and argues that citizenship is based on involvement in the political community.’®
Francis Fukuyama explains the disconnect between these two notions of citizenship by
accounting for the role of rule of law in determining democratic citizenship. Democratization,
and with it the formation of an equitable concept of citizenship, is the process of extending the
rule of law beyond social elites to all members of society.’® The advantage of this view of
citizenship is that it adds some degree of rigidity to Marshall’s fluid notion of citizenship.
Moreover, this view of citizenship provides a means of analyzing the evolving Chinese
conception of citizenship discussed below.
Education, in particular, is key to providing access to equal citizenship. Many
contentious issues related to expanding citizenship have centered on education issues. The
debates surrounding Brown v. Board of Education, the integration of American universities, and
the Dream Act have challenged notions of citizenship and inclusion. Sociologist Herman van
Gunsteren argues that education is the most effective way of extending citizenship and equality
of opportunity to marginalized sectors of society. Education is the means by which notions of
citizenship are imparted, and it provides the easiest means of social mobility.”° This thesis will
draw broader conclusions about the citizenship status of migrant workers in Shanghai and
Suzhou by examining the quality of their children’s education opportunities.
*® agnus Stewart, “Two Conceptions of Citizenship,” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 1, (March 1995):
63.
* Francis Fukuyama, “Transitions to the Rule of Law,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 1, (Jan. 2010): 38.
?° Herman van Gunsteren, A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies, Boulder, CO,
Westview Press (1989) 83.

Chinese Conceptions of Citizenship
Chinese society has long attached labels to different segments of its population. Post-

revolution China has focused primarily on changing definitions of “people,” but the
aforementioned concept of citizenship as a measure of political, legal, and economic rights has
largely been the subject of Western debate. The general principles of citizenship found in
various United Nations documents and international treaties are also codified in the current
Chinese constitution, but in reality the policies of the People’s Republic of China have created
separate notions of “nationals” (guomin), “citizens” (gongmin) and “people” (renmin). During
the ideologically charged years following the Communist Revolution in 1949, all of China’s legal
residents were permitted to think of themselves as nationals, but only members of the working
and peasant classes were considered to be members of the people, and found themselves more
privileged. The word “citizens” appears in government documents but does not have much
applied meaning.

The legacies of feudalism and class conflict remain; the “people’s” state is

still the ultimate manifestation of political authority in China. The notion of citizenship as a
package of intrinsic and inalienable rights bestowed upon those born in China has not yet been
fully embraced by political society.” Rather, in China the concept of citizenship is more
concerned on the responsibilities, rather than the rights, of individuals. This view of citizenship
is consistent with the “state citizenship” concept described by Angus Stewart in the previous
sections—citizenship in China defines the subordinate role of individuals to the state, rather
than describing the state as a summation of individuals with rights and privileges.

Vu, Xingzhong, "Citizenship, Ideology, and the PRC Constitution," in Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern
China, by Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2002), 288-307
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The Importance of the Study

The distinction between urban and rural citizenship in China has been studied
extensively. Dorothy Solinger argues that institutional biases and prejudices against rural
migrants have prevented China’s rural residents from attaining any meaningful measure of
citizenship. Solinger notes that market forces have drawn millions of peasants out of China’s
countryside despite the discrimination they will eventually face.” On the whole, Solinger
argues that market forces have no inherent benefit for migrant workers; relying on the market
will not provide the necessary catalyst to bring about improved rights for the floating
population. By providing higher paying jobs in more desirable locales, the market forces that
lead to migration quell much of the potential for unrest amongst migrant workers; even if their
situation is not ideal, they are better off as unregistered migrants in the city than as
underemployed residents of the countryside.”* Li Zhang takes a more moderate view,
suggesting that the late socialist government-dominated market economy of reform-era China
has created a distinct definition of “urban citizenship” that entails guaranteed subsidized
housing, health care, and free education for the children of urban residents, while rural
residents occupy a parallel sphere of citizenship, a situation which has the potential to create a
“separate and unequal”

|’

state of affairs.”*

China’s migrant population is well-studied from a macro-perspective; both Chinese and
foreign scholars have documented and described the broad patterns of labor migration that
began during the reform period. This thesis will attempt to use that framework to analyze the
22 Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China 36.

”? Ibid, 280.
411 Zhang 313.

legal and social status of migrants at the municipal level, specifically Shanghai and Suzhou
because of the role they play in the changing landscape of labor migration in China. As a direct-

controlled municipality, Shanghai has a higher degree of autonomy with regards to public policy
than most Chinese cities. “> Suzhou, located in southern Jiangsu province, benefits
economically from its proximity to Shanghai (about a 30 minute train ride) but lacks its political
autonomy. Moreover, both of these cities have been the destination for the second wave of
domestic migration that began in the late 1990s. This second wave of migration has been
driven more by the expansion of the service economy than by the construction and
manufacturing sectors which fueled much of the migration that began in the 1980s. As a result,
Shanghai and Suzhou have not had to conform to the demographic or political model set by
earlier migration to Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and other cities along China’s southern coast.

As China’s largest and arguably most globalized city, Shanghai is a magnet for labor
migration and its public policies are considered the more progressive of China’s major cities.”°
Shanghai's status as an economic powerhouse has made it an influential leader in political and
economic changes.

Moreover, as a direct-controlled municipality like Beijing, Shanghai has

more flexibility and autonomy in terms of setting public policy. Suzhou provides an interesting
comparison to Shanghai; as a comparatively wealthy prefecture-level city, Suzhou has
benefitted both from its proximity to the coast and its close ties to Shanghai.”’ Given the
differences in both economic structure and political status between these two cities, it is likely
> China’s four direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing) are independent of
China’s provinces and are governed solely by the central government. As a result, they have more autonomy than
other cities under provincial governance.
® Jeffrey N Wasserstrom, Global Shanghai, 1850-2010: A History in Fragments, (New York) Routledge, 2009, 108.

7¥ehua Dennis Wei and C. Cindy Fan, "Regional Inequality in China: A Case Study of Jiangsu Province,"
Professional Geographer, Vol. 52, No. 3, (2000), 458.
10

that significant policy differences exist in these two cities. Both of these cities have significant

populations of migrant residents. At the time of the 2000 census, Shanghai had over 3 million
non-native residents, or nearly 20 percent of the city’s total population; Suzhou had 1.5 million
non-native residents, or approximately 15 percent of the total population.”° Though these
figures represent a large proportion of the population of Shanghai and Suzhou, most of China’s
cities that are popular destinations for migrant workers have encountered a shortage of

migrant labor in the past few years.”°

Methodology, Data, and Preliminary Hypotheses

The ultimate goal of this thesis is to determine to what extent rural migrants in Shanghai
and Suzhou have been able to obtain a meaningful degree of citizenship. Scholars suggest that
the situation of rural peasants and migrant workers in particular has improved since the
beginning of the reform period, but until they gain a status equal to that of their urban
compatriots, the degree to which they can be called citizens must be qualified. Writing in the
1990s, Dorothy Solinger described rural peasants and migrant workers as essentially “noncitizens” because of the restrictive hukou system and institutional biases, but noted that their
situation was improving. Building on Solinger’s work, Li Zhang concedes that the situation of
migrant workers has improved, but also suggests that China’s rural and urban residents still
exist in distinct spheres of citizenship. Based on a general reading of the current literature,
particularly Li Zhang’s suggestion that the status of rural-to-urban migrants has improved since
7° National Statistics Bureau of China, County-Level Data Analysis from the Fifth Census (2000), 20 September 2010,
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000fenxian/fenxian.htm>.
*° Deng Fengtian, "The Primary Reason of the Migrant Worker Shortage is the Delay in 'Urbanizing' Migrant
Workers [Minggonghuang Shenceng Yuanyin Shi Nongmingong Shiminhua Zhihou]," www.ifeng.com, March 22,
2011 <ttp://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/fzhl/20110322/3722141.shtml>.
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the publication of Dorothy Solinger’s work, the logical hypothesis for the overarching question
surrounding the nature of rural-to-urban citizenship is that members of the “floating population”
in Shanghai and Suzhou have come closer to attaining a more complete citizenship.

This thesis will use the above definition of citizenship as a model for evaluating
questions regarding the public policies of Shanghai and Suzhou. First, it will attempt to provide
a qualitative analysis of the relevant laws and regulations of Shanghai and Suzhou. Do rural
migrants in these cities have, at least in theory, any legal rights to basic social services? Chapter
three relies on primary source texts of these laws and regulations as well as secondary source
accounts and scholarly research on them. This chapter will also consider the degree to which
non-governmental organizations have influenced public policy. These sources suggest that
there have been modest attempts to include legal migrants into broader urban society since the
middle of the 1990s; however, the scope of these laws is relatively narrow.

Chapter four examines how well policies affecting migrant workers are enforced,
especially in terms of access to education. After determining the legal rights of both
unregistered and registered migrants in this respect, this chapter will discuss to what extent
equal access by migrant children to education is protected. This portion of the thesis will
consider the ability of migrant children to enroll in school, the existence of “migrant only”
schools, and the general quality of migrant child education.

Chapter five examines current debates surrounding the rights and status of migrant
workers in Shanghai and Suzhou. This analysis provides some understanding of how the
situation for migrant workers has changed since the publication of Solinger’s and Li’s work. This

12

analysis will provide an indication of how the citizenship status of migrant workers has
progressed along the course that is suggested in Li’s work. It also considers the particular

impact of the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai on the public perception of migrants. Data for this
analysis will come from the aforementioned sources as well as Chinese newspapers and other
media.

If citizenship can be understood as a linear progression from total lack of citizenship to
full citizenship rather than in, black and white terms, then the data will show that migrant

workers in these two cities have moved towards “total citizenship” along this linear progression.
Moreover, the strong economic relationship between these two cities suggests that public
policy changes in Shanghai may have a spill-over effect in neighboring cities such as Suzhou.
However, the significant differences that exist between Shanghai and Suzhou suggest that their
respective treatment of migrant workers may have noticeable differences. Given the relative
autonomy of Shanghai and its international exposure, Shanghai has more favorable policies
regarding migrant workers. Support for this hypothesis would suggest that an improved
situation for rural migrants in these cities may be indicative of a broader policy change in China
that will erode the distinction between rural and urban citizens.

13

Chapter IJ: The Hukou System and
China's Rural-Urban Divide
“This is the first time I’ve ever heard the term ‘urbanized peasant.’ There’re a lot of urbanized
peasants out there who are a lot richer than | am. But there are also quite a number of people
worse off than | am. Since they’re totally unskilled there’s nothing anybody can do to help them.”
-Zhang Baojian*°
Though both the nature and implementation of China’s hukou system are well
understood, there have been different explanations of the origin of the rural-urban division of
citizenship and its consequences. Population registration has been a part of Chinese
governance for millennia. Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, among others, point to the influence
of the baojia system of mutual surveillance that was widespread in imperial China. They also
acknowledge the impact of the population control systems developed during China’s civil war in
the 1940s and the inspiration that came from the Soviet Union’s passbook system.*” Scholars
also agree on the role that hukou restrictions played in Mao Zedong’s China. Li Zhang notes that
the rigid divide between urban and rural citizenship was necessary for China’s centrally planned
economy, and Dorothy Solinger contends that the system was originally enacted because of a
Marxist aversion towards urbanization.** This chapter will consider these arguments and the
effect that population registration has had on the diverging statuses of rural and urban
citizenship.

3° Thang Xinxin 110.
3 Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System,” The China
Quarterly, No. 139, (Sep. 1994): 645. Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants,

the State, and the Logic of the Market, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (1999), 30-33.
321i Zhang 312. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China 34.
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The Hukou System of Population Registration

Internal migration during the initial years after the 1949 revolution was relatively
unrestricted, and the Great Leap Forward industrialization campaign from 1959-60 resulted in
the forced migration of nearly 20 million peasants to China’s cities. However, by the end of the
1950s the Chinese government reversed the direction of rural-urban migration by deporting
more than 50 million people back to the countryside and standardizing enforcement of the
hukou system. From 1960 until the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1978 ruralurban migration was extremely limited.°? The political restrictions on internal movement, which
resulted in one of the lowest periods of net internal migration in modern Chinese history,
stemmed from a desire to promote social stability—controlling rural to urban migration was
viewed as a “public order issue.”*’ By the end of the 1970s, only 16 percent of China’s
population held a “non-agricultural” hukou and all the social benefits that entailed. “Though
the hukou system remained in force during Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” period,
new free markets for food in the city allowed rural migrants to find jobs and buy food on the
open market, even if they retained their rural hukou. This new freedom, combined with labor
shortages in urban China, led to the beginning of the largest migration in modern history.
In 1979, the central government of China enacted a series of economic reforms aimed at
liberalizing the economy by adopting market-based economic policy. The most immediate
consequence for China’s peasants came with the dismantling of communes. The return to
family-based agriculture created an overwhelmingly large surplus of labor in the countryside.
Mackenzie, Peter W., "Strangers in the City: The Hukou and Urban Citizenship in China," Journal of International

Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, (2002) 307.
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Based on the amount of arable land in China, improvements in agricultural technology, and
rural population growth, Cheng Li calculated in 1996 that this labor surplus was around two
hundred million people. The agricultural sector in China has been unable to accommodate this

surplus in labor, and, consequently, market forces have pushed many of these rural residents
into China’s cities.°° For much of the 1980s and 1990s, rural workers were able to migrate to
cities, but they retained their official identity as rural citizens. Throughout the early years of the
reform period, the pull of market forces led migrant workers to newly-created Special Economic
Zones in southeastern China, namely Shenzhen. In recent years migration flows have shifted
towards Shanghai and Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.

Even as migrants found better-paying jobs in cities, the economic and political
conditions they found there relegated them to a “second-class” citizenship. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s most registered urbanites were sending their children to school and had stable
housing. At the same time, just forty percent of migrant children were enrolled in school and
more than half of all migrants lived in dormitories or shelters. Migrants were also barred from
most public health programs, which exacerbated negative perceptions held by urban residents.
Many cities also restricted migrants to jobs in low-skill sectors, preventing social mobility. All of
these obstacles reinforced migrants’ status as second-class citizens during the early years of the
reform era. *’ The economic changes that took place during the 1980s and 1990s also had a
limiting effect on migrant workers’ ability to improve their social status. For much of this era,
the labor surplus in the countryside was far greater than the immediate need for labor in

Li Cheng, "Surplus Rural Laborers and Internal Migration in China." Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 11, (1996), 1129.
7” Mackenzie 312.
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China’s cities, leaving prospective migrant workers with little leverage to demand better

working conditions or living standards.*®
Despite similar interpretations of the hukou system’s origins, scholars disagree on what
were the most important antecedents to the modern hukou system and the causes of the
current inequality between urban and rural citizenship. This portion of the thesis will discuss
some of the major approaches to explaining the origin and impact of the rural-urban divide in
China. One approach, advanced by Li, Cheng, and Selden, suggests that the origins of the
modern hukou system lie in Chinese culture and modern ideologies. Another theory, advanced
largely by Solinger as well as Bgrge Bakken and Cheng Li, places more emphasis on the role of
the economy, particularly the role of market forces. A final approach, developed by Guangqing
Xiong, suggests that the urban-rural divide is the product of active political exclusion on the
part of the Chinese state and urban society. These three approaches can be viewed as rough
approximations of the cultural, economic, and political influences that have affected the ruralurban divide in China.
The hukou system has changed with other economic reforms; though detailed policy
varies from city to city, rural migrants can work and live in cities with fewer restrictions than in
the past. Only government offices and other state-owned enterprises restrict employment
based on a citizen’s hukou.*?

However, the liberalization of China’s internal migration policies

has moved at a slower pace than broader economic reforms; there is little market incentive to
extend social welfare programs to rural-to-urban labor migrants. The higher wages offered in
urban labor markets serves as a powerful “pull” factor that attracts rural migrant workers;

** Ibid, 316.
8 Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China, 115.
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urban employers do not have to offer costly entitlements. This has aggravated inequality as
urban residents belong to different social classes that are legally defined based on birthplace.
Dorothy Solinger notes that although economic reforms allowed rural workers to move to cities,
the institutional bias in favor of urban residents has remained, albeit at a more muted level
than during the late 1980s. The goal of these initial reforms, Solinger claims, was not to fully
enfranchise rural residents, but to untether them and convert them into a mobile source of
labor.” Despite the persistent institutional bias against rural migrants, the migrant population
in China continues to grow rapidly, and now represents a significant proportion of China’s
population. As these migration patterns move towards permanent, rather than seasonal, labor
migration, there is likely to be an increased demand for reform to accommodate these new
realities.

The Effects of Population Registration on the Rural-Urban Divide

The shifts in public policy and public opinion in favor of migrant workers are likely due to
a combination of several factors: market forces, political change, and a broader social
acceptance of rural migrants. This section describes the role that each of these three influences
has had in the creation of China’s rural-urban divide. Though none of these influences is
capable of instigating change independently, they have successfully complemented each other
and provide a theoretical understanding of these two competing notions of citizenship.
The Spatial-Ideological Argument

“Ibid, 45.
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The notion that there is a relationship between spatiality and citizenship has been

applied to many cities afflicted with social unrest. Class conflicts that occurred in Los Angeles
and Sao Paulo are rooted in the same underlying sense of a spatially delineated citizenship that
Li Zhang finds in China.*? With regards to the urban-rural citizenship divide in China, the
argument from culture and ideology looks to the history of population registration in China and
the anti-urban Maoist ideologies that have influenced modern China for an explanation for the
current hukou system. Li argues that the culture of China’s socialist period led to the
solidification of the spatial politics that have endured in China. The hukou system has divided
China into two distinct spheres of citizenship, the city and the countryside.” It went beyond
establishing a simple separation based on a sense of spatial identity; access to housing, food
rations, medical care, and education, as well as the right to marry and join the army were tied
to one’s hukou. As a result, the hukou, and by extension one’s birthplace, wholly defined the
individual concept of citizenship. The stark difference between the generous services provided
to urban residents and the weak social net extended to rural residents cemented this spatial
understanding of citizenship.”
The “explicit asymmetry” between rural and urban spheres of citizenship, Li contends,
has been challenged by the changes in China’s economy. With the end of collective agriculture,
the state lost its justification for tethering rural citizens to state-owned land to work in stateowned industries. Following the death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent collapse of Mao-era
ideology, the need to distinguish between the countryside and the city became less

“Li Zhang, 328.
” Ibid , 314.
“? Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden, 644.
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compelling.“* The emergence of a large floating population that exists outside of these
conceptual barriers has eroded the need for spatial delineation. However, while China has
moved away from its planned economy, the experience of the socialist past continues to affect
current political discussions, particularly in social issues such as the spatial concept of urban-

rural citizenship. China’s planned economy created a class of urbanites who were reluctant to
embrace a migrant class that threatened the privileges of urban residents.”
The lasting legacy of these experiences and the hukou system was the creation of two
separate “nations” within China, one urban and one rural. Thus, the continuing debate about
the role of the hukou system focuses on the necessity of this spatial distinction in a nation with
an increasingly mobile population. As rural citizens migrate to the city and unemployed urban

citizens are cut off from the socialist-era social safety net, these migrants have begun to create
a new system of citizenship that suits modern China.”° The movement to a new concept of
citizenship was met with resistance by the urban elite and municipal governments. The general
perception among China’s urban residents was that migrant workers are “stealing local
residents’ rice bowls,” and several cities have restricted employment in certain sectors to
registered urban residents. Li Zhang argues that these restrictions are the product of lingering
cultural attachment to a strict system of population registration.” The spatial argument is
particularly acute in China because the state remains the sole owner of land in China.
Consequently, the state has control over who may access urban areas. The implication of this
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cultural-ideological argument is that the changing nature of citizenship in urban China is closely

tied to evolutions in culture that will lead to political reform at the national level.”®
The argument that either feudal or post-Revolution culture is the primary origin of the

rural-urban divide in modern China is not a particularly compelling explanation for the
continued second-class status of migrant workers in China’s cities. Though China does have
strong cultural traditions and a distinct rural identity, many of these cultural legacies have given
way to political movements and economic change since the Communist Revolution in 1949.
Economic changes in particular provide a clearer picture of how the status of China’s rural
residents and migrant workers has changed.
The Market Forces Argument
Though Dorothy Solinger and other scholars acknowledge the role of ideology and
culture in defining China’s hukou system, they view them as the products of broader market

forces that have driven population movement. Beginning in the 1980s, market forces created a
tiered system of citizenship with “true citizens” (urban residents) on the top and “noncitizens”
(the poorest of migrant workers) on the bottom.*? Market forces have created a system of
“oush and pull factors” that have transferred millions of surplus laborers from the countryside
to the city. In many ways, these push and pull factors are manifestations of the unequal
citizenships held by urban and rural residents. Income disparities, poor support for agriculture,
and minimal access to social services have left rural residents dissatisfied with the

countryside.°°

“ Ibid, 329.
“8 Solinger, 279.
*° Borge Bakken, Migration in China, Copenhagen: NIAS Press (1998), 12.
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The push and pull factors of the market forces are closely tied to the evolution of
China’s surplus labor. China has a fifth of the world’s population but only a fraction of the

world’s arable land. Moreover, the ever-increasing size of China’s labor forces has created
disincentives to use land efficiently or sustainably. These conditions have created a labor
surplus of nearly 200 million people. *? The growing income gap in China has created a pull
factor that draws these surplus laborers out of the countryside; regardless of discrimination or
unfair labor practices migrants may face in the city, they are still benefitting economically from
the higher wages offered in urban areas.” Though the state has attempted to alleviate the
problem of surplus labor in rural China by encouraging the growth of township-village
enterprises (TVEs), Li shows that the jobs created by TVEs, ** which peaked at nearly 60 million
between 1978 and 1986, cannot compensate for the growing size of China’s rural labor
surplus.°* The movement of surplus labor in China is controlled by blind market forces largely
outside of state control.
The pressing question for Solinger is how a fledgling market economy will affect an
emerging concept of equal citizenship. China’s market reforms have diminished the state’s
ability to define citizenship with differing levels of social services and opportunities; a new
concept of citizenship will emerge from the “logic of the market.” The market, at least in the
early stages of reform, has been a poor means of providing the rights of migrant workers; in the
equations of market capitalism, migrants are human capital filling labor vacancies in urban

5 Cheng Li, Rediscovering China: Dynamics and Dilemmas of Reform, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers (1997), 114.
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areas.” The possibility of a fairer citizenship determined by market forces is less reliable than

the political and cultural evolution suggested by the spatial-ideological argument. Solinger
argues that market capitalization may impede the progression towards full citizenship because

it is leading to the dismantling of the welfare state enjoyed by China’s urban residents. Urban
residents have, in the past, channeled their fear of economic changes into discrimination
against migrant workers. 6
Solinger is not as optimistic about either the direction political changes have taken with
regards to migrants’ rights or the ability of migrant workers to be agents of change. With the
gradual dismantling of state-owned enterprises, urban employers, with the support of the
government bureaucracies, have discovered in the countryside a readily available source of
labor that is not entitled to the costly welfare provisions enjoyed by urban citizens. This
problem has been accentuated by the prominence of foreign investors in China’s new economy.
As investors and low-level officials collude to attract business to the local economy, there is no

system in place to protect the well-being of migrant workers.””
The push-and-pull factors of the market forces argument provide a logical explanation
for the onset of migration in China. Liberalization of the Chinese economy created simultaneous
labor shortages in the city and labor surpluses in the countryside; rural-to-urban migration was
essentially inevitable. The key advantage of this explanation is that it provides a means for
comparing the leverage of different waves of migrants. As the demands of the Chinese
economy become more specialized and the “pull” factors change to meet these expectations,

% Bakken 13.
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urban economies have become more dependent on migrants, who in turn should have more
power to make demands of their employers and the local government. However, the
government may be slow to act and concerns about political exclusion by urban elites remain
an issue.
The Political Exclusion Argument
Guangaing Xiong, a sociologist at People’s University (Renmin Daxue), suggests a third
explanation for the perilous situation of migrant workers’ citizenship in modern China. Though

Xiong acknowledges the role of market forces and Chinese culture in creating discriminatory
attitudes towards the floating population, he suggests that the disparity in the citizenship rights
of registered urbanites and migrant workers is the product of active political exclusion on the
part of the Chinese state and Chinese urban society. This political exclusion entails restrictions
on membership in political organizations and a general lack of representation at the municipal
government level. The effects of this exclusion are apparent in all aspects of migrant life. In
economic terms, migrant workers invariably hold undesirable and low-paying jobs that often
come with poor working conditions. These jobs also lack any sort of long-term stability and
worker protection because of migrants’ exclusion from state-run trade unions.
The floating population also faces significant challenges in obtaining social services and
social acceptance. With respect to public health, Xiong notes that maternal mortality rates in
Beijing are nearly three times higher for migrant workers than for registered citizens, and the
ten year infection rate for malaria is nearly sixty percent for the floating population of

°® Guangqing Xiong, Zhongguo Liudong Renkou Zhongde Zhengzhi Paichi Wenti Yanjiu [Research on Questions
Concerning Political Exclusion within China's Floating Population], Beijing: Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (2008), 76.
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Shenzhen.°* Migrant workers also face challenges with social exclusion. Xiong notes that the

social circles of migrant workers essentially consist of immediate family and friends from the
countryside. Moreover, a majority of registered urbanites in Xiong’s study had negative views
of migrant workers, attributing increases in both crime and public health problems to their
presence. As a result, migrant workers are deprived of many of the informal advantages that
come with belonging to society, such as word-of-mouth communication of various social
programs and an increased sense of social security.” The children of migrant workers also
suffer from their parents’ social status; Xiong found that nearly half of children aged 6 and
under had yet to enter school, and nearly 10 percent of migrant children had not completed

any compulsory schooling.™*
Xiong places the greatest emphasis on the nature and impact of political exclusion
among China’s migrant populations. To measure political exclusion, Xiong compares the
participation in political organizations, social organizations, labor unions, local elections and
other organizations of civil society for both registered residents and migrant workers. Overall,
Xiong found that registered urbanites were twice as politically involved as members of the
floating population. Significantly, Xiong found no difference between the political participation
rates of recently-arrived and established migrants; length of time in the city does not lead to
increased political inclusion.© These results are significant because they suggest that China’s
migrant workers are excluded from both civil and political society in China. Thus, their ability to
bring about social change is dependent on concurrent developments in public policy.
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Xiong notes several causes of this political exclusion. First, he argues that China’s social
structure has developed at a slower pace than its economy—despite China’s economic
modernizations, there is still a strong social divide between urban and rural residents. As

evidence he cites the difference in social programs that have been provided to China’s urban
and rural populations. While the urban population had enjoyed institutional support in terms of
employment, material provisions, social welfare, and other subsidies, the rural population has

largely been left to fend for itself in these areas.’ The relative hesitancy of political
organizations and officially-sanctioned social groups to include migrant workers and rural
citizens has also contributed to this form of political exclusion.“ Xiong also argues that political
exclusion has been magnified by increased social stratification in China’s cities. He notes that
the difference in the relative value of agricultural products compared with industrial products
has increased almost by a factor of 150 in favor of industrial products; the urban-rural income
gap has also grown accordingly.°° The result is that there is a large segment of the urban
population that the state has neither attempted to protect from market forces nor to
incorporate into broader society. This political exclusion has imperiled the migrant population’s
ability to attain a meaningful degree of citizenship.
Conclusion
There is significant overlap among these three views on the origin and consequences of
the rural-urban divide in China and its impact on citizenship. All of them acknowledge the role
of changing market forces in China and the failure of the Chinese state and society to react

* Ibid, 119.
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accordingly: However, the different aggravating causes suggested by these theories suggest

If
three different understandings of how the rural-urban divide in citizenship may be resolved.
then both the state and the
China must address the weight of culture and changing ideology,
economy must adapt to satisfy these cultural obstacles. If the current state of affairs is the
into the
product of market forces, then migrant workers must continue integrating themselves

urban economy and hope that market pressure improves the situation of these migrant
workers. If migrants are the victims of active exclusion on the part of the state and society, then
either the state must voluntarily enforce social change or migrant workers must forcefully
demand it. Analyzing the relationship between public policy, the enforcement of public policy,

and the popular debate about the direction of public policy will provide a clearer understanding
of the trajectory of the evolution of urban citizenship in China.
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Chapter III: The Policies of Shanghai and
Suzhou
“What’s the matter with being rich? | made my money with my own hands thanks to the
government’s policy. The thing is, though, if you’ve got the skills but there’s no policy to protect
you, they'll attack you sooner or later for being a member of the ‘new bourgeoisie.’”
-Zhang Baojian®
This chapter addresses the policies in place in Shanghai and Suzhou that affect migrants
in these cities. It begins with a discussion of the hukou system established by the Chinese
central government in the late 1950s, which has remained largely unchanged by the central
government since then. It will then describe the municipal policies of Shanghai and Suzhou.
After elaborating on how these policies are regulated and enforced at the city level, this
chapter looks specifically at how municipal policy deals with education for non-hukou holding
children and enrollment in other social services.

These policies have improved the legal status of migrant workers, however, the poor
enforcement or unobtainable prerequisites attached to these policies limit the scope of their
influence. Conservative estimates suggest that at least one fifth of Shanghai’s population (four
million people) and one third of Suzhou’s population (two million people) are people with nonlocal hukou status. The migrant population of Shanghai now represents nearly a fourth of
China’s rural-to-urban migrants, and Shanghai is now the second most popular destination for
migrants after Guangdong Province. Despite Shanghai and neighboring Suzhou’s status as a hub

“Zhang Baojian, as a first generation migrant during the late 1980s, represents the views and challenges faced by
migrants in the early years of the reform period. From: Zhang Xinxin, Chinese Profiles, 109.
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for migrant labor, most migrant workers (nearly 90 percent) are “unregistered” to some

degree.”
General Stipulations of the Hukou System

In 1958, the Chinese Government issued the Regulations of Population Household
Registration for the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji
Tiaoli), a document that laid out in broad terms the structure of population registration in China.
Though the terms of this document are still in force today, they leave ample room for
interpretation at the local level. Originally, China’s hukou system created a highly fragmented
society. The Public Security Bureau (PSB) in each municipality was responsible for issuing hukou
passbooks to residents under their jurisdictions, while the local governing committees of towns
and villages had similar responsibilities in the countryside. Moreover, the various cooperatives
were responsible for issuing passbooks that were both industry and region specific.

Local governments have broad discretion in how to apply the basic stipulations of the
1958 document. The law places significant restrictions on domestic travel; any personal travel
longer than three days in the city or ten days in the countryside requires registration with
relevant authorities, and stays of over three months require more formal immigration
procedures. In general, changing one’s permanent hukou requires exceptional circumstances,
such as marriage, divorce, or other major family events. Permanently moving to the city

*” Roulleau-Berger, Laurence, and Shi Lu, "Migrant Workers in Shanghai: Inequality, Economic Enclaves, and the
Various Routes to Employment," China Perspective, Vol. 58, (2005) 9.
8 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, "Regulations of Population Household Registration for

the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli]," (Beijing) 1958, 1.
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requires permission from one of three agencies: the municipal department of labor, the
municipal hukou registration agency, or a university in the city. It is these organizations that

have had the most flexibility in extending the benefits of urban citizenship to China’s migrant

workers.°*
Municipal Policies of Shanghai
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Public Security Bureau of Shanghai recognized two
types of legal resident: those who hold Shanghai hukous and those who hold residence permits

(juzhuzheng). The PSB issues residence permits which serve as the official identification for legal
migrants. Access to social services, such as education, health care services, and social security,
also depends on obtaining one of these permits.” In general, there are three avenues by which
migrant workers can apply for a residence permit: proof of stable employment, invitation by a
university or employer, or the invitation of a family member. There are no explicit criteria for
granting or denying a residence permit, but in theory, anyone who can provide documentation
reflecting one of the above criteria will be granted a permit.

Formally changing one’s permanent hukou is a more difficult and complex process than
simply obtaining a temporary residence permit. Only residence permit holders can apply for a
Shanghai hukou, and the relevant policies for obtaining one are determined by the city
government of Shanghai, not the Public Security Bureau. These procedures echo the
aforementioned guidelines established by the central government, under which a formal
69).
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change in hukou is usually reserved for exceptional circumstances. Despite the difficulty in
obtaining a permanent hukou, residence permit holders do enjoy some benefits in terms of
obtaining education for their children and enrolling in other social services.

Education

One of the stipulations of a residence permit is that the children of permit holders may
apply to enroll in local schools to receive their compulsory education (elementary and middle
school). ”* In general, the children of permit holders are able to enroll provided their parents
can show proof of residence, their national identity card, and proof of enrollment in some form
of social insurance. Restrictions in terms of school enrollment are tied to these residence
permits; parents can only enroll their children in schools in the district where they are
registered, and can only apply for compulsory education during the period during which their
residence permits are valid. The children of these legal residents are also, at least in theory,
guaranteed the same level of treatment accorded to native-born residents of Shanghai.
However, parallel schools for the children of migrant workers are also allowed to operate
legally, with no guarantee of the same standard of education.’* Municipal policy also limits
access to education to compulsory education, that is, elementary and middle school. Children
of residence permit holders are guaranteed neither a place in high school, nor the right to apply
to universities as Shanghai residents. Applying as a non-Shanghai resident increases the

” Ibid, 2.
” Shanghai Standing Committe on Education [Shanghaishi Jiaoyu Weiyuanhuil], Five Changes Brought About by the
Procedures Implemented by Shanghai to Help the Children of Migrant Workers Receive Compulsory Education
[Shanghaishi Shishi Jinchengwu Gongrenyuan Suigian Zinv Yiwujiaoyu Sannian Xingdong Jihua Dailai Wuda
Bianhua], Shanghai: Shangahi Committee on Education (2010) 1.
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standards required for admission to a Shanghai university, creating a distinct disadvantage for

migrant children in the city.”°

Health, Social Services, and Additional Services

Holders of residence permits and their children also have access to a package of health
services shared by native-born Shanghai residences. Permit holders can take advantage of
preventative health care, vaccines, and similar health services that are provided free of charge.
They are also entitled to basic family planning services as directed by the central government.
However, non-preventative health insurance is not offered on a universal scale; it is provided by
some government employers and work units, but there are no provisions guaranteeing such
care to non-hukou holders. Resident permit holders are entitled to the same (non-medical)
comprehensive insurance and social insurance programs that are established for native-born
Shanghai residents. Additionally, permit holders have access to other miscellaneous services
such as drivers’ licenses, various job training programs, the right to file patents, and the right to
participate in “model worker” competitions.”

Employment

With the exception of the aforementioned job training programs and similar benefits,
residence policies in Shanghai say relatively little about the right to employment. Rather,

2 Shanghai Committee on Education [Shanghaishi Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui], Regulations on the Enrollment of the
Children of Residence Permit Holders in Shanghai Schools [Chiyou <Shanghaishi Linshi Juzhuzheng> Renyuan Zinv
Ruxue Guiding], Shanghai: Shanghai Committee on Education (2010), 1.
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Shanghai makes obtaining a residence permit dependent on first having stable employment
from a Shanghai-based employer.’° This harkens back to the hukou system for the 1950s when
one’s work unit (danwei) or cooperative was responsible for monitoring and restricting

population movement.

Municipal Policies of Suzhou
As a prefecture level city in Jiangsu Province, Suzhou exists in a different political climate
than Shanghai. Though it benefits economically from its proximity to Shanghai, it is still under
the immediate jurisdiction of the provincial government of Jiangsu, in addition to the central
government. Thus, the framework in which Suzhou may determine hukou and other population
registration policies is beyond the control of the municipal government.

Similar to Shanghai, local governments throughout Jiangsu province grant temporary
residence permits (zanzhuzheng) to nonresidents of Jiangsu who immigrate to the province.
The local Public Security Bureau is responsible for issuing these permits.’”° These permits serve
as the primary official identification of temporary residents in Jiangsu, and are valid for only one
year. The regulations outlined by the provincial government give the Public Security Bureaus
broad discretion in determining eligibility for residence permits, as well as in establishing

measures to verify compliance with provincial and national laws. ””
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The city of Suzhou, building on the regulations issued by both the central and provincial
governments, has established regulations on the issue of relevant resident permits to non-

Suzhou hukou holders. The day-to-day work involved is delegated to local Public Security
Bureaus, to whom temporary residents must report within three days of arrival to Suzhou.
Temporary residents who will stay in Suzhou longer than one month must be issued a
temporary residence permit to reside legally in Suzhou.”® Applicants for a temporary residence

permit must be sponsored by either a relative with a Suzhou hukou, an employer based in
Suzhou, or by the landlord of a rented house or apartment. ”° As in Shanghai, the temporary
residence permit serves as a gateway to education and other public services.

Education

The children of non-Suzhou hukou holders have rights similar to their compatriots in
Shanghai. Those with an official residence permits are guaranteed some form of compulsory
education. However, in some cases these children may be assigned to “migrant children”
schools that exist in the same “separate but equal system” that is reported to exist in Shanghai.
Enrollment in primary and middle schools is tied to possession of a valid temporary residence
permit, which much be renewed annually. The city of Suzhou has made a concentrated effort
to guarantee that all children residing in Suzhou, regardless of hukou or residence permit status,

” The People's Government of Suzhou, Foreign Population Management Regulations of the City of Suzhou
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receive the same quality of education.*! The effectiveness of these efforts will be considered in
the next chapter.

Health, Social Services, and Additional Services

In general, residence permit holders are extended access to the same social insurance

and preventative health care programs that hukou holders are offered. As in Shanghai, these
health care provisions are limited to basic, preventative health care. The only health care
program specifically named by the provincial government of Suzhou is mandatory enrollment in
family planning programs; evidence of participation with the local family planning officials is
required for all female temporary residents over the age of sixteen in order to guarantee
compliance with the one-child policy.®

The government of Suzhou also extends various forms

of non-medical social insurance to non-residents, regardless of their legal status. This insurance
includes elderly care, unemployment, work-related injury and other types of coverage.®?

Employment
As in Shanghai, employment is more a prerequisite to obtaining legal residence in
Suzhou than it is a perk of holding one. For those not attending a university in Suzhou or with
relatives with Suzhou hukous, an invitation from a stable, local employer is the only way to
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obtain a residence permit.” However, the city of Suzhou does not require that employers make
these invitations. As in Shanghai, the city of Suzhou offers expansive employment training to
both official and unofficial temporary residents. The training, which offers basic technological

and office skills, is provided free of charge to any migrant worker with stable employment.®°

Analysis

For the most part, migrants lucky enough to obtain residence permits in Shanghai are
granted access to the social services that their native-born Shanghai compatriots enjoy. They
can enroll their children in local schools, take advantage of preventative health programs, and
enroll in various job training programs. However, there are notable omissions and gray areas in
the residence permit policy. Residence permit holders are also excluded from most
manifestations of political society, as well as labor unions or similar organizations. Residence
permits serve as a gateway to these public services, but legal migrant workers remain identified
as permanent residents of wherever they have a permanent hukou. Additionally, while those
with residence permits have, in theory, access to the same services as native-born residents of
Shanghai, there is a danger of a “separate but equal” or “separate and unequal” system of
services, as demonstrated by the existence of migrant-children schools. The system of migrant
education, which serves between a third and half of migrant children in Suzhou and Shanghai,
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

“The People's Government of Suzhou, Foreign Population Management Regulations of the City of Suzhou, 2.
* The Peoples Government of Jiangsu, Suzhou Provides Free Employment Training to Extra-provincial Workers,
Suzhou: The People's Government of Jiangsu (2010) 1.
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The rights contained in these policies are only granted to holders of official residence

permits who meet some ill-defined criteria. The burden created by these stipulations undercuts
the optimistic view presented by the text of these laws as it is likely that many members of
Shanghai’s floating population, namely those in labor intensive jobs or other low-skill sectors of
society, remain essentially “undocumented.” Not only are these individuals denied most of the

public services afforded to residence permit holders, they are also more excluded from political
society than residence permit holders. During the 1990s, nearly two-thirds of working migrants
held temporary residence permits, though many of their dependents remained undocumented.
In addition, barely one third of migrant workers were registered with their place of work.

The situation for migrants in Suzhou is largely similar to that of those in Shanghai; they
can obtain temporary residence permits with the proper invitation and access a basic set of
social services. However, the policies of Suzhou exhibit the same shortcomings of those found
in Shanghai. There is significant ambiguity about how permits are granted and how the local
PSB determines compliance with these policies. The government of Suzhou makes no effort to
ensure that all migrants to the city become legal migrants; despite the existence of outreach
programs intended for these “undocumented” workers, there is still a significant difference
between the treatment of residence permit holders and other migrants. Moreover, Suzhou
runs the risk of having the same “separate and unequal” system of social services.

The policies of both Shanghai and Suzhou regarding temporary residents and other
migrants use grandiose language to declare support for the rights of migrant citizens, the
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continuation of economic development, and insuring equality. The governing documents for
temporary resident registration in both Shanghai and Suzhou speak at length about the need to
preserve the rights of all citizens, continue the development of the economy, and building
socialism. Moreover, the primary documents outlining the general structure of migration

policies in both these cities stress the need for social stability or individual concerns. References
to “strengthening the advanced of socialism” and “establishing a harmonious society” are not
uncommon; rhetoric concerning individual welfare or social equality are absent. There has been,
however, movement in Shanghai and Suzhou away from “temporary residence permits”
(zanzhuzheng) in favor of more permissive residence permits (juzhuzheng).®°

Ultimately, there is a clear disconnect between policy formation at the level of the
central government and policy implementation at the local level. Part of this disconnect is due
to larger problems with the rule of law in China. Francis Fukuyama looks beyond the history of
population registration in China and suggests that broader aspects of Chinese culture have an
impact on the rule of law, and by extension, the enforcement of laws meant to protect and
advance the rights of migrant workers and registered rural residents. Fukuyama traces the
origins of China’s legal systems to edicts from emperors who “recognize no authority higher
than” themselves. This cultural history of positivist legal systems, as opposed to the codified
and religious-based legal systems found in the West, has created a legal culture where the

*§ Cao Tianxiao, "Suzhou Residence Permit System Undergoes Complete Implementation in One Quarter [Suzhou
Juzhuzheng Zhidu Yi Jidu Qiquanmian Shishi]," 24 January 2011, Suzhou News Net, 25 February 2011

<http://www.subaonet.com/html/livelihood/2011124/C1JFI9B5BI09J3B.html>.
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yernment of China controls the constitution
, rather than the other Way around.®”
6°

consequently, any laws meant to protect the rights of migrant workers that propose Significant
legal changes in China face cultural barriers
to their enforcement. Given the historic
difficulty of

integrating migrant workers into urban society, poli
cies that relate to migrant issues are likely

to have similar issues regarding implementation.
Non-governmental Organizations have been
able to alleviate some of the problems created by poo
r enforcement by working within the rigid
system that governments them. Howeve
r, the ability of NGOs to influence
public policy is
limited. Subsequent chapters will elaborate on the difference betwee pol
n
icy and practice in
urban China by discussing the quality of migran
t children education. The measurements will

provide a clearer picture of how well the
municipal governments of Shanghai
and Suzhou are
implementing these policies.

es

8
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Chapter IV: Migrant Education in
Shanghai and Suzhou
“On the other hand, with a good policy and no skills, there’s no way you’re going to make it
through either. What good is a person with no skills? Even if the government forced you to get

rich, you'd never make it.”

-Zhang Baojian®
In December 2010, the city of Shanghai made headlines when its students scored, by a
significant margin, the highest scores in the world on the Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) exam in each of the test’s three sections (science, reading and math).

Shanghai’s achievement was undercut by the glaring omission of the rest of mainland China—
while Hong Kong and Macau participated and performed well, no other city or region publicly
participated in the PISA examination. Critics were quick to note that Shanghai’s performance is
not indicative of China as a whole, or even of all of Shanghai’s students.” This implied disparity

between education in Shanghai and the rest of China was dramatized by director Zhang Yimou
in his popular 1999 film Not One Less (Yige Dou Buneng Shao). The film portrays the deplorable
tural school conditions that push many children to urban areas to find work, as well as the
urban elites’ combination of curious sympathy towards and emotional distance from the plight
of rural students. The disparity between these two classes of education is not confined by
physical location—as migrants have moved to urban China with their children, many have
found that they are not welcome in city public schools and have been forced to enroll their
children in low-quality private schools established specifically for migrant children. This chapter

* Zhang Xinxin 109.
8 Dillon, Sam, "Top Test Scores From Shanghai Stun Educators," 7 December 2010, nytimes.com. 14 Februrary

2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/education/07education.htmI> 1.
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will address these parallel systems of education and the attempts to promote education
integration and equality in Shanghai and Suzhou.

The Legal Status and Basic Conditions of “Unregistered Household” Schools

The right to education is enshrined in the constitution of China, and this right is not
restricted to those residing within the area listed on their hukou. The Compulsory Education
Law of the People’s Republic of China states that children ideally should attend schools where
they are registered residents, but this document was amended in 2006 to reflect the needs of
an ever-growing migrant population. Now local governments are mandated to provide
education to school-aged children, even if they have a non-local hukou. Moreover, the law

compels local governments to guarantee some measure of equality when providing education
to migrant children. However, the law leaves the specific regulations to the discretion of local
governments, and urban governments throughout the country have experimented with

different approaches to incorporating migrant children.”
These experiments are essential because the onset of mass migration to urban China
has presented a significant legal challenge to China’s education system and strains the
provisions of the Compulsory Education Law. Public schools in most cities have been unwilling
or unable to accommodate most migrant children, but all are guaranteed by the Chinese
constitution nine years of compulsory education. Private schools have been established for
migrant children in many cities to meet the excess demand for education, but these schools
often provide substandard conditions, suffer from poor instruction, and lack necessary permits
* standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of
China, Beijing, 2006.
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Migrant Education in Shanghai

The number of school-aged migrant children in Shanghai has grown rapidly in the past
decade. In 2001, more than 500 small, privately run schools served a student population of over

100,000 children. These schools generally suffered from the substandard conditions found in
much of urban China’s migrant school system—hygiene and health standards were below
acceptable levels, teachers lacked formal training, and the basic facilities used by students and
staff were rife with safety concerns. With the accelerating growth of Shanghai’s migrant
population, the municipal government has made significant efforts to reduce the inequality
between these parallel systems of education and integrate migrant children into the city’s
public schools.”?

In 2006, the city of Shanghai began a program to allow privately-run migrant children
schools to receive official approval in order to meet the new requirement of the Compulsory
Education Law. Schools were given three years to meet the standards set by the government
and apply for the requisite permits. The city also allowed migrant children whose parents
successfully applied for a temporary residence permit to enroll in local public schools.” By 2007,
almost 60 percent of Shanghai’s nearly 400,000 migrant children were enrolled in public
schools. Government reports suggest that this figure represents the limit of the current public

* China Youth Daily, "Investigation of the Closure of a Shanghai Migrant School [Shanghai Yi Mingong Zidi Xuexiao
Bei Qudi Diaocha]," 15 January 2007, news.qq.com, 17 February 2011
<http://news.qq.com/a/20070115/000231.htm>.
* shanghai Standing Committee on Education, "The Shanghai Standing Committee on Education's Concerns
Regarding the Strengthening of Including Migrant Children in Regulated Schools Management Policies [Shanghaishi
Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Yi Zhaoshou Nongmingong Tongzhu Zinu Weizhu de Mingbanxiaoxue Guifan
Guanli de Ruogan Yijian)," 27 January 2010, 17 February 2011 <http://code.fabao365.com/law_483890_2.html> 3.
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school system to enroll migrant children; accommodating the remaining 40 percent would
create an unsustainable financial burden on the city government. Allowing privately-run schools
to receive official approval both relieves the financial pressure on Shanghai’s government and
provides an option to parents who cannot obtain temporary residence permits.”

The government’s experience with this plan has largely been successful. Students who
leave private migrant-only schools and enroll in local public schools are charged a tuition fee,
usually less than 300 RMB per year, equivalent to the fee they had been paying at the private
school, lessening the financial burden presented by moving schools.”° The quality of education
that students at schools that have met official benchmarks receive is comparable to that at
public schools. By 2007, a total of 23 schools in Shanghai’s Pudong district had received official
recognition and assistance. The improvements at these schools over their 2004 conditions is
dramatic—the city government invested nearly 700,000 RMB per school, provided training to
teachers and administrators, and aided in the construction of new facilities. These schools also
receive a subsidy of 2000 RMB per enrolled migrant student.”

Shanghai's policies attracted significant media attention in early 2007 after Jianying
Hope School, a migrant school largely attended by Anhui natives, was forcibly closed at the end
of the fall 2006 semester and its students were sent to a nearby public school. The initial public
reaction was outrage—students had been preparing for exams, and the school had been
operating with impunity for over ten years. However, subsequent investigations portrayed the

government’s actions in a more favorable light. Jianying Hope School had flouted the

** Gong 2
* Ibid, 2.

"Ibid, 4,
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aforementioned policies and lacked necessary permits. The school of nearly 2000 students had
only four primitive bathrooms, and was constructed using the same material used to build
temporary dormitories for construction workers. Officials found serious hygiene concerns, and
nearly a third of the school’s teachers lacked teaching certificates. The new school was a
significant improvement for the 1800 students who ultimately enrolled there. The facility of the
new school is nearly ten times larger than Jianying Hope School, and is staffed by qualified
teachers using a nationally approved curriculum. Most students are eligible for tuition waivers,
and those that are not pay no more than they had been charged at Jianying. Officials with the
Shanghai education department said that with the closure of Jianying, fewer than 20 percent of
migrant children in the city center still attended migrant-only schools.”

The migrant population of Shanghai has grown rapidly since the government'’s efforts to
integrate migrant students began, and the scope of the government’s programs has as well.
There were almost 400,000 migrant children old enough for compulsory education in 2007; this
figure grew to nearly 500,000 by the end of 2010. Over 70 percent of these students are
enrolled in public schools, and are supported by government investments totaling 100 million
RMB, The remaining students are enrolled in private schools that have met, or are in the
process of obtaining, official approva 1.°° The city of Shanghai has expressed that its ultimate
goal is to integrate all school-aged children and to guarantee that migrant children have the
opportunity to receive equal treatment in the education system.

** China Youth Daily, "Investigation of the Closure of a Shanghai Migrant School,” 15 January 2007.
* Zhong, Fan, "Shanghai Migrant Children Can Receive Free Compulsory Education-- Total of 470,000 Children
Affected [Shanghai Mingong Zinu Keyi Jieshou Mianfei Yiwu Jiaoyu--Gong Sheji 47 Wan Ren]," 10 January 2011,
Bancheng Evening Post, 17 February 2011 <http://gb.takungpao.com/edu/news/2011-01-10/455690.htmI>.
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In 2010 the Shanghai education department issued a report discussing the progress
made since the policy allowing private migrant schools three years to achieve official
recognition was implemented. The report notes significant progress; the number of private,
migrant child schools had fallen to 151, down from 500 in 2001. This decline was the result of

consolidation into larger, better-constructed schools.and the integration of many migrant
children into the public school system. The policy has resulted in increased financial subsidies to
these private schools and a greater degree of regulatory control over them. Despite these
advances, the report notes that there still exists a noticeable inequality between the two school
systems, and lays out a roadmap for future policy. The report urges the city to increase the
inclusion of migrant children into the public school system and to increase regulation of schools
that remain private. Additionally, the report calls for the city to increase financial support for
school subsidies, teacher training and capital improvements to private schools. Ultimately, the
report suggests an optimistic future for migrant children in Shanghai. Despite lingering issues of
inequality, the proportion of migrant children enrolled in public schools or officially sanctioned
private schools has increased dramatically in the past ten years.

Migrant Education in Suzhou

The pattern of migration to Suzhou and the corresponding development of migrant
schools are roughly similar to what occurred in Shanghai. The first privately-run school for
migrants in Suzhou was founded in 1999; by late 2001, there were over 140 schools. Unlike the
larger schools found in Shanghai, many of the migrant schools in Suzhou were essentially two

© shanghai Standing Committee on Education, 6.
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or three rented rooms, a used van, and a couple dozen students who had migrated from the
same area as the school principal." The teachers at these schools came from similar
backgrounds; many of them were acquaintances of the school’s founder and had not
completed high school.?™ The problems presented by educating migrant children were

especially urgent for the municipal government of Suzhou. Between 2001 and 2006, the
number of school-age migrant children in Suzhou grew from 100,000 to over 220,000, a figure
that represented a third of Suzhou’s total student population. A study conducted by Suzhou

University found that the quality of education at these private schools lagged significantly
behind that at public schools, particularly as students moved from primary to middle school.
Average passage rates for exit exams were as low as 5 percent for English, and hovered around

50 percent for other subjects.
The city of Suzhou began pursuing policy solutions similar to those used by the
government in Shanghai in 2006; by relaxing restrictions on public school enrollment and
increasing oversight of private schools, the municipal government hoped to improve equal
access to education among Suzhou’s migrant community. The program’s early results were
underwhelming. The city claimed that 60 percent of migrant children were enrolled in public
schools, but a study by Suzhou University found that the actual figure was significantly less than
what official reports claimed.*™ The reasons for these poor results were largely related to cost;

Suzhou Department of Education, "Investigation of Migrant Children Schools [Mingong Zidi Xuexiao Diaochal,"
10 March 2003, Suzhou Department of Education, 8 February 2011 <http://www.szedu.com/show.asp?id=4927> 2.
102
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“ Wang, Xiange, "How Migrant Children's Education Can Resolve Difficulties: A Case Study of Suzhou [Mingong
Zinu Jiaoyu Ruhe Zouchu Kunjing--Yi Suzhoudiqu Weili]," 31 December 2009, Suzhou University Urbanization

Research Center, 8 February 2011 <http://rurc.suda.edu.cn/ar.aspx?AID=607> 4.
1044.

Ibid, 1.

47

parents of migrant children could not afford the 500 RMB and higher tuition fees and deposits
required, and described a spot in a public school as “an unimaginable luxury.” Parents also
worried about the rigidity of public school system; the lax private schools their children

attended allowed them to miss school for work or trips home. Other parents did not see the
point of worrying about education when their children, in their minds, were destined for a life

of migrant labor.’

Statistics from the early years of Suzhou’s integration program suggested there was
some truth to this fear. By 2003, fewer than half of migrant students in Suzhou continued to
high school in either Suzhou or their home region; most of the rest remained in Suzhou and
found part time jobs. However, the quality of the migrant education began to improve from
2004 on as the private school industry matured and the government was able to refocus its
efforts. By 2005, the typical privately-run migrant school had at least 400 students and more
permanent facilities..°° Most teachers had at least gone to technical schools, and many had
teaching certificates. Students at these schools were markedly more optimistic about their
education, and a higher percentage took the Suzhou high school entrance exam. As the quality
of private school education increased and the number of migrant children grew, the city
redoubled its efforts to incorporate these children into the public school system. In late 2002
the city issued a regulatory document, Methods for Managing “Floating Students” School
Enrollment, to clarify its approach to enrolling migrant children. The city’s efforts had an
immediate effect on migrant enrollment in public schools; a full 10 percent of new students in
°° Suzhou Department of Education, "Investigation of Migrant Children Schools [Mingong Zidi Xuexiao Diaocha],"

10 March 2003, Suzhou Department of Education, 8 February 2011 <http://www.szedu.com/show.asp?id=4927> 4.
06 Wang, Lingling, "Questions of Migrant Education in Suzhou [Suzhou Wailai Mingongzinu Jiaoyu Wenti]," January

2006, Education Commentary, 8 February 2011 <http://www.szggg.com/information/Show.Asp?ID=643> 1.
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2003 were the children of migrant workers, and that percentage increased in subsequent

years.

7

By 2006, nearly three fourths of Suzhou migrant schools had met official standards and
were included under the regulatory auspices of the city government. The city also dealt with
non-approved migrant schools more aggressively. In extreme cases, schools that had serious
safety concerns were closed and students were moved to nearby public schools.’ Though
Suzhou is the epicenter of migration to Jiangsu Province, the municipal government of Suzhou
has been unable to provide the financial resources found in Shanghai. Nevertheless, Suzhou has
made significant improvements to the fledging private system of migrant education since the
industry was founded in the 1990s." A majority of private schools that cater to migrants in
Suzhou now fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal government, and most migrant children
now attend public schools or sanctioned private schools. Though Suzhou has not yet provided
the level of equality found in Shanghai, it is clearly on the same trajectory.

Analysis
Migrant education has dramatically improved since the mid-2000s, largely due to an
increase in public awareness of the plight of migrant children. Moreover, the development of
the migrant labor force has made investing in migrant education a sound decision for municipal
governments. Most migrants in these two cities intend to reside there long-term; they and their
children are less transient than the migrants of earlier decades. In both Shanghai and Suzhou,
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*® Qiu, Min, "74 Migrant Schools Enter City of Suzhou Education System [74 suo Wailaigong Xuexiao Naru
Suzhoushi Jiaoyutixi]," 11 January 2009, Suzhou News Net. 8 February 2011
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* Wang Lingling, 1.
49

municipal governments have undertaken efforts to bring the private system of migrant

education under their control. In general, policies relied on three methods of integrating
migrant students. When possible, migrant schools have been incorporated into the public
system as publicly-run private schools. Schools that lag too far behind in health and education
standards are closed and their students sent to local public schools. Finally, both Suzhou and
Shanghai are beginning to replace temporary household registration policies with more
permissive and long-term permits that allow more access to public education.

Providing better access to education is essential in creating a more equitable notion of
citizenship to migrants, particularly as more and more migrants move to the city with the
intention of remaining long-term within the city. Education provides the best means for crossgenerational social advancement in any society; in a country that emphasizes education as
much as China, access to a quality education is essential to escaping lower class status. Though
universal education for migrants and local residents does not include either secondary or
tertiary education, a higher quality compulsory education improves migrant children’s chances
of testing into high school or university. Education is also an essential part of the citizenship
formation process; equality in education will translate to more equal social treatment in the
workplace. Conversely, the existence of low-quality migrant schools reinforces the idea that
migrants are an “outside class” in Shanghai and Suzhou. Though the segregation of migrants in
certain schools, even if they are state-regulated, raises concerns about equality, the increased
attention paid to this issue by municipal governments is a positive development for the
citizenship of migrant workers in these two cities.
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Chapter V. Media Perception of Migrants
in Shanghai and Suzhou
“What’s so great about Shanghai anyway? The people there hardly have any money. They don’t
have color TV or decent places to live in either. But they keep making fun of us, like we’re their

stupid country cousins or something.”

-Zhang Baojian'"©

Migrant workers in urban China have long suffered from discrimination and
apprehension on the part of China’s urban elites. The Chinese term, “floating population,”

connotes a degree of vagrancy and criminality that goes beyond its literal characterization of
migrants’ mobility. Moreover, the early incarnations of the hukou system were designed to

prevent migration in the name of preserving public order, resulting in a modern view of migrant
workers as potential criminals.“

111

Many of these biases and fears were bolstered by the legal

separation between urban and rural residents; as the pace of market forces has drawn migrants
to the city faster than municipal governments could adapt, these cultural biases have remained.

Cultural factors have reinforced the institutional discrimination against migrant workers.
Li argues that the hukou system has more than economic meaning for Chinese citizens—it

contributes to an individual’s sense of identity and is a powerful cultural label."”” The
perception among China’s cultural elite of rural migrants has evolved alongside the legal
landscape that defines and regulates them. At the onset of the reform period, migrant workers
were, by default, associated with any social ill that plagued urban communities. Stereotypes
So
419 7hang Xinxin, Chinese Profiles, 102.
11 Mallee 85.

12 1) Zhang 315.
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about migrant workers were unapologetically derogatory; Dror Kochan cites an extreme
characterization of this dominate narrative:

Regardless of whether it is the conversation of ordinary urbanites or the opinions of
important government officials that one is listening to, regardless of whether one is
watching a popular film or television program or reading the work of an authoritative
expert, one will be given more or less the same description of rural people who enter
urban areas: that is that they are, in the main, stupid, dirty, lacking in breeding, and

without any sense of shame. You will be told that the country people pouring into the
cities are, if not active, then latent, robbers and plunderers, prostitutes and pimps, ‘out-

of-plan guerillas’ and carriers and transmitters of contagious disease.’
This perception of migrant workers was manifest in both contemporary film and news media;
news reports during the 1990s suggested that any increase in crime in urban areas was
correlated with the ever-growing “floating population.

7114 owever, the narrative surrounding

migrants began to change in the 1990s as China’s cultural elite dismissed the rigid association
between migrant workers and social ills and began to discuss migrants in human terms. Kochan
highlights a number of documentaries, films, and television series that portray sympathetically
the plight of individual migrants.’”° Surveys of headlines from the 1990s reflect a combination
of apprehension and pity towards migrant workers—they were still associated with social ills,
but urban media had begun to accept that internal migration is an inevitable side effect of
adopting a market economy.**© Newspapers of this era did occasionally publish articles that
reflected positively on migrant workers and their contribution to society; however, these
articles were invariably reports from social scientists and never represented the “editorial voice”

*? Dror Kochan, “Visual Representation of Internal Migration and Social Change in China,” China Information, Vol.
23, No. 2, (2009), 287.

4411 Zhang 318.
45 Kochan 287-289.
48 Davin, Delia, Internal Migration in Contemporary China, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. (1999) 160.
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of the media.*”” The narrative of rural-to-urban migration is making a definitive shift towards a
more accepting attitude; the question is whether municipal governments are following suit.

This chapter will discuss the degree to which media representation and perception of
migrant workers has changed in Shanghai and Suzhou by analyzing the editorial attitudes of
leading newspapers in these two cities. Analysis for Shanghai will consider material from the
Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao), a daily newspaper published by the Shanghai Committee of the

Communist Party of China and the Shanghai Daily, an English-language newspaper largely
marketed towards foreigners in Shanghai. This section will also consider press releases and

news articles distributed by the committee in charge of the 2010 World Expo that was held in
Shanghai. Analysis for Suzhou will be based on articles from Suzhou News Net, an online
consortium of two of Suzhou’s flagship newspapers, the Suzhou Daily and the Suzhou Evening
Post. This section will consider attitudes towards the general situation of migrants in these two
cities, the quality of migrant children’s access to education and the broader nature of rural-tourban migration in China. Analysis of media perception in Shanghai will also consider migrantrelated issues surrounding the World Expo that was held in Shanghai in 2010.

Media Perception in Shanghai

Views on the General Situation of Migrants in Shanghai

In 2009, the city of Shanghai began a program that would, theoretically, make the
process of becoming a registered resident of Shanghai easier. Applicants who had a minimum

"” Davin, Delia,"Migrants and the Media: Concerns about Rural Migration in the Chinese Press," Rural Labor Flows
in China, by Loraine A. West and Yaohui Zhao, 278-291. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies (2000) 283.
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number of points based on their educational background, employment history, skills, and other

accomplishments, could convert their residence permits into formal household registration
cards, An editorial published in the Liberation Daily criticized the plan for being too narrow in
scope and warned that these new policies would only benefit relatively wealthy migrants who
could game the system. The paper called on Shanghai to expand this point system to be more
flexible, allowing low-skilled migrants from less affluent backgrounds to gain some degree of
stability. The ultimate goal of Shanghai’s household registration policies, in the paper’s view,
should be to provide peace of mind to the workers who formed the backbone of Shanghai’s
growth. "8

A follow-up editorial from mid-2009 argues that recent changes to Shanghai’s
household registration policies should be viewed as a transitional program, and that Shanghai
should ultimately strive to include all long-term residents of the city as citizens. The editorial
emphasizes the “floating population” of Shanghai as a marginalized group that should have its
legal rights enforced and protected. The editorial highlights policies of neighboring provinces
that, while they do not extend full hukous to migrant workers, allow migrant workers to reside
in these areas long term and do a better job of attracting talented workers from the
countryside. The Liberation Daily implies that these less restrictive measures should be the next
step for Shanghai’s own household registration system.’?° A news article from 2010 shows that
the municipal government of Shanghai has made progress along these lines by extending

“* Tong, Dahuan, "Changes to the Shanghai Residence Policy Forecasted to Increases Hope for Job-seekers'
Stability (Shanghaihuji Gaige Yuan Geirencai Wending de Yuqi]," 14 January 2009, Liberation Daily, 25 February
2011 <http://www.jfdaily.com/a/56076.htm>.
"* Wang, Lin, "Household Regsitration Reform Should Be a Starting Point [Hujigaige Yingcong Buduanban Chufa],"

6 June 2006, Liberation Daily, 25 February 2011 <http://www.jfdaily.com/a/55466.htm>.
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programs to attracted skilled migrant workers from the countryside. The paper referred to
these policies as a “badge of honor” for Shanghai and expresses optimism about the future of

the city’s household registration policy.’°
A 2010 editorial in the English-language Shanghai Daily suggests that political progress
was not enough to rectify the discrimination against migrant workers. The author notes that
even as migrants are getting more social benefits and access to better schools, social prejudice
is still strong and influences public policy. The urban elite of Shanghai views migrants as
convenient sources of labor and pieces of the larger puzzle of Shanghai’s economic
development. Most policies that affect migrants, in the authors’ view, are directed at increasing
levels of migrants’ consumption in order to pursue the government's broader goals of

increasing revenue. The author argues that policies directed at improving migrant workers’
quality of life and social stability would have the dual effect of assuaging the ills of migrant life

and developing the Chinese economy by creating a stronger working-class.”
Views on Migrant Education

A Liberation Daily editorial from 2009 described the problems facing migrant children
when enrolling in school. Students are required to provide no fewer than ten documents to
prove that they are eligible to enroll in Shanghai public schools, a burden that most members of
China’s “floating population” cannot meet. The paper suggests that local governments look at
the example of Suzhou, which simplified this process in 2006. The paper argues emphatically

"Ve, Feng, "The Door to Shanghai Household Registration Once Again Widens to "Talented Migrants " [Shanghai
Hujizhimen Zaici Xiang "Youxiu Nongmingong" Qiangkai]," 8 January 2010, Liberation Daily, 25 February 2011
shttp://www.jfdaily.com/a/808176.htm>.

? Wan, Lixin. "Migrants Do Our Dirty Work But Don't Consume," 12 August 2010, Shanghai Daily, 2 March 2011
<http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/print.asp?id=446091>.
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In the same editorial discussing the role of Shanghai’s new household registration
policies, the Liberation Daily hopes that progress made by the government of Shanghai could
serve as a model for all of China’s regions, not just the typical destinations for migrants.

126

In

a

later editorial, the Liberation Daily denounces the “black” existence of most migrant
communities and the businesses that cater to them across China. These unregistered
households and businesses, the editorial argues, contribute to the instability that plagues
127

lower-income levels of society. “” The Liberation Daily referred to the example of household
registration policies in Beijing to summarize the general problem with this issue. The primary
function of household registration and the issuance of temporary residence permits in Beijing
was to simplify the job of government statisticians and the Public Security Bureau. The
Liberation Daily applauds the transition towards a more permissive system of registration and

encourages the same in Shanghai.’”®

The Shanghai Daily makes similar arguments about the general state of migrant rights in
China, Migrants have made significant sacrifices to the nation’s growth, but “these sacrifices do

not seem to have figured in the minds of policy makers.

» 129

The rapidly changing dynamic of

China’s population means that the government should begin treating them differently, a later

editorial argues. Migrants are more mobile than during the 1980s and 1990s, and in the longterm, the government’s goal should be the integration of migrants into the city’s social
"Tong 1.
2 hi Ping, "The Appearance of "Black Villages" in the City Is Simply Due to a Lack of "Sunshine" [Dushi Chuxian
Heicunzhuan, Zhi Yinshao "Yangguang"]," 05 August 2010, Liberation Daily, 2 March 2011

shttp://www.jfdaily.com/a/1315946.htm>.
"* liberation Daily, "Citizens Rights Flourishing: Temporary Residence Permits Are Losing Their Relevence
(Gongmin Quanli Rixing: Zanzhuzheng Zhengshiqu Cunzai de Yiyi]," 13 January 2009, Liberation Daily, 2 March

2011 <http://www.jfdaily.com/a/56085.htm>.
Ni Tao, "You Can't Force Filial Piety But You Can Help Migrants Go Home," 13 January 2011, Shanghai Daily, 2
March 2011 <http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/print.asp
?id=461374>.
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provided the labor that made the Expo possible, without ever explicitly calling for long-term

improvements in their living conditions.'?°

Media Perception in Suzhou
Views on the General Situation of Migrants in Suzhou

The general attitude towards migrant workers and their families found in Suzhou
newspapers is one of acceptance and awareness of a changing economy. An editorial from the
Suzhou Evening Post in 2010 noted that the demand for labor in Suzhou was projected to
increase by 50 percent by the end of 2010. This increased demand for labor has been
accompanied by a changing demographic in the rural labor pool. The paper notes that migrant
workers since the 1980s have much higher expectations for their standard of living, and these
expectations should be met with more generous compensation packages and better treatment
by the city government. These younger migrants make up nearly two-thirds of new residents in
the city, and generally have higher levels of education than their parents’ generation. The
editorial board calls for Suzhou to create a stronger “pro-labor” atmosphere that will allow
migrants to feel more welcome in the city.*°

The city began experimenting with ways of incorporating migrants in early 2011 by
altering its temporary residence regulations. Beginning in the first quarter of 2011, temporary
residence permits (zanzhuzheng) were replaced by laxer residence permits (juzhuzheng). The

*5 xp0 2010 Shanghai China, "China Bids Farewell to Successful Shanghai World Expo," Expo 2010 Shanghai China,
November 1, 2010, <http://en.expo2010.cn/a/20101101/000004.htm> (March 21, 2011).

6 suzhou Evening Post, "The Need for Migrant Workers Should Be Met with a "Pro-Labor" Mentality [Liuzhu
Nongmingong Dangyou "Qingong" Linian]," 1 March 2010, Suzhou News Net, 25 Februrary 2011
<http://www.subaonet.com/html/opinion/201031/8B6C8AC38BEB9KG.htmI>.

59

difference between these two permits is significant—under the new system, migrants will be
free to move throughout Jiangsu Province without the hassle of registering. More significantly,
migrants can use these new residence permits to register their children for schools, apply for
public health insurance, and legally seek employment. The editorial board of the Suzhou Daily

welcomed these new policies as an acceptance of the new role of migrants in the city
population. By 2011, migrants constituted half of Suzhou’s population, and more than two-

thirds of these migrants hoped to remain in the city long-term.” Ultimately, these attitudes
and these new policies represent the municipal government’s acknowledgment of new market
forces that have altered Suzhou’s demography. Economic growth has accentuated the need for
alarger labor force, and changing cultural attitudes have elevated the role migrant workers play
in the new economy.

Views on Migrant Education

Editorials in Suzhou have taken a similarly pro-migrant stance with regards to the
education of migrant children. In a terse opinion piece from 2008 about city inspections of

migrant schools, the editorial board of the Suzhou Daily makes its position clear: “Our migrant
brothers contribute a great deal to the construction and development of our city. When
considering the education of their children ought we not to give them more attention and

"cao 1.
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care?””* The inspection, which was originally designed to check the sports facilities of these
schools, found instead overcrowded classrooms and deficient hygiene standards.

A feature article from 2010 profiling a newly-constructed migrant school reflected a
more positive outlook on the situation of migrant children. By the end of 2009, nearly a third of
compulsory age students were migrants and more migrant schools were meeting requirements
set by the city. The article notes that the onset of programs has had a significant and positive
impact on the overall situation of migrants and points to the better integration of migrants into
Suzhou as a result.’°° The article notes the increase in funding for migrant school construction,
subsidies for migrant students, and extracurricular opportunities.” The article also advances
an argument regarding the treatment of teachers at these schools, an issue that had received
relatively little attention in previous years. The low wages offered to teachers at migrant
schools leads to a high-turnover rate, which in turn undermines the physical improvements
made to these schools.’“* These newspapers have closely followed the improvement of migrant
education since reform of the migrant education system began in 2007. A full third of “new
citizens of Suzhou” are migrants; their integration and acceptance into Suzhou society is
portrayed as an essential step in continuing Suzhou’s economic development.*”

*8 Suzhou Daily. "Who Should Bear the Cost of Inspecting Migrant Children's Schools [Mingongzidi Yingjian Daijia
Sheilaidan?]." 19 November 2008. Suzhou News Net. 25 February 2011

<http://www.subaonet.com/html/opinion/20081119/A943CFG520B7KB5.html|>.
*® Suzhou Evening Post. "The Pains of Growing Up in a Migrant Children's School [Wailaigong Zidixuexiaode

Chengzhangzhitong]." 22 November 2010. Suzhou News Net. 25 February 2011
<http://www.subaonet.com/html/szedu/20101122/D630HIOG8DHE1IH_3.htmI>.

Ibid, 2.
* bbid, 3.
*® Suzhou News Net. wi "New Little Suzhou Residents" in Each Age Group Account for 30 percent ["Xiaoxin
Suzhouren" Zhan Tongnianlingduan Haizi de Sancheng Yishang]." 28 October 2010. Suzhou News Net. 25 February
2011 <http://www.subaonet.com/html/ori_livelihood/20101028/101028154650597485779.htmI>.
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Views on the Migrant Population of China

The Suzhou Evening Post has a view of the situation of migrants across China similar to
its view on migrants within city limits; as the economy changes and migrant labor becomes

essential in multiple sectors of industry, migrant workers should not be treated as an
exploitable resource. An editorial from 2009 openly denounces firms that help migrants find

jobs in the city, then exploits them and saddles them with “debt” as a result of their migration.
The editorial goes further and calls on the central government to increase job opportunities for
migrant workers and to decrease barriers to the job opportunities that currently exist. Currently,

the influx of migrants to some cities that results from these job placement companies has led to
an increase in unemployment and underemployment among many migrant communities.
Though Suzhou is a regional hub for migration, its newspapers recognize that the issues facing
migrants in Suzhou are relevant to all of China.“

Analysis

Though the four newspapers discussed in this chapter have significantly different
corporate structures and intended audiences, they all tend to display a decidedly pro-migrant
editorial opinion. This opinion goes beyond the progress made by municipal governments by
decrying the continued social stigma that plagues migrant workers, even as they are enrolling
their children in public schools and finding stable employment. The relative coherence between

the editorial views of the Liberation Daily and the Shanghai Daily is particularly noteworthy. As

8 Suzhou Evening Post, “Services Helping Migrant Workers Blindly Enter the City Are Unacceptable [Nongmingong
Mangmu Jincheng Wugong Yaobude]," 16 February 2009, Suzhou News Net, 25 February 2011
<http://www.subaonet.com/html/opinion/2009216/315GGJ9JSIHBDG7.htmI>.
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the paper of the local Communist Party and an English-language newspaper, respectively, these

two papers’ agreement on a pro-migrant integration stance suggests a growing acceptance of
migrants on the part of the urban elite. These newspapers’ reactions to government policy are

also significant. In general, they have responded to changes in household registration policy or
migrant education with optimistic and constructive criticism. While noting the progress

represented by these advancements, the editorial boards of these newspapers have been
consistent in their calls for further liberalization and greater social acceptance of migrants.
Despite the generally positive view towards migrants held by these newspapers, the
official stance on migrant workers and the World Expo is less optimistic. Though the official

committee in charge of the World Expo repeatedly expressed its appreciation to these workers
and called them, at least rhetorically, members of the Shanghai family, there is no indication

that the World Expo was a major impetus in shifting public opinion. While the World Expo was
not as influential in shaping public policy as the 2008 Beijing Olympics was on environmental
policy, the general positive view of migrant labor during the Expo is congruent with newspaper
views.

The positive correlation between public opinion and public policy is well-established for
modern, Western democracies.’ However, the Chinese media serves a distinctly different

purpose because of the high degree of state control over the media. Press freedom is
essentially non-existent, and any criticism of the government is expected to be mild.’ Criticism
of particularly sensitive issues, such as China’s entry into the World Trade Organization and the
4 aul Burstein, "The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda," Political Research
Quorterly, Vol. 56, No.1, (2003): 6.
ws Congressional-Executive Commission on China, "Media Freedom in China," Roundtable before the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (2002) 2.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
In each of the three aspects—the general legal rights of migrants, the quality of migrant
education, and the media perception of migrants—of migrant citizenship discussed, migrants in
Shanghai and Suzhou have seen significant improvements in the relative equality of opportunity
their citizenship affords them. Though officially registering as permanent residents of these two
cities remains a difficult process, movement towards more permissive residence permits
(juzhuzheng) removes some of the obstacles created by early programs. Migrant education in
particular has become a priority of the municipal governments of Suzhou and Shanghai.
Migrant-only schools benefit from public oversight, and more migrant children are enrolling in
public schools. Though the disparity between urban residents and migrants still exists, shifts in
public opinion in the media of these two cities suggests an optimistic trajectory for the future of
migrant citizenship.

Differences between Shanghai and Suzhou

Despite the significant differences in the political structures of Shanghai and Suzhou, the
study did not find any data to suggest that these political differences have impacted how these
two cities have worked towards the integration of migrants into urban society. Though
Shanghai benefits from a larger budget, both Shanghai and Suzhou have instituted roughly
similar policies designed to increase the stability of migrant life and provide migrants with
better access to social benefits. The data do suggest, however, that Shanghai and Suzhou are
similar in that they are the destination of a second wave of migrants that has arrived in these
cities with more education and that pursue more specialized jobs. As a result, promoting the
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ideal proxy for general public opinion. Further study should address either polling data or a

more comprehensive survey of media representations of migrant workers. Further study should
also address the agency of migrants in bringing about these changes through their own actions,
rather than relying on state actions.

The results of this thesis have theoretical implications as well. An improvement in
migrants’ rights at the municipal level suggests that Chinese political society may be moving
towards an equal conception of citizenship as described above. Given the relative size of
China’s migrant population and its importance in bolstering China’s development, such a
transition would be tantamount to the civil rights movement in the United States. Discussions
about the rights of migrant workers in China raise similar questions about the plight of
undocumented workers in the United States. Though both of these groups have been
integrated into the economies of their new homes, they have been subject to de jure and de
facto political discrimination in spite of their economic contributions. The fate of China’s
migrant workers may be a fair case study of the role of migrant workers worldwide.”

Prospects for the Future
The distinction between urban and rural residents of China has been attributed to the
economic, political, and social factors discussed in chapter two. Similarly, the shift towards a
more inclusive urban society can be tied to shifts in these conditions. The role of market forces
in improving the legal status of migrants has been particularly strong. During the early years of
the first wave of migration that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of surplus

workers in the countryside far surpassed the employment capacity of China’s cities. This
7 Mallee 84.
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imbalance allowed employers to ignore demands for higher wages or better conditions. Since
2000, the structure of the migrant labor pool and needs of urban employers have approached
equilibrium, and migrant workers’ relative status within the urban economy has improved. This
is particularly true for migrants in Shanghai and Suzhou, two cities that have been the
destination of a “second wave” of migrant workers. The majority of migrants in these two cities
are employed in trade, skilled-manufacturing, and similar sectors. 18

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations and Migrant Self-Agency

The Chinese Department of Social Organizations Management reports that there are
over eight thousand NGOs in Shanghai and nearly thirty thousand in Jiangsu Province. Many of
these groups focus on migrant issues, particularly highly visible issues such as migrant children’s
health and migrant women’s safety,“ Government regulation limits the effectiveness of these
organizations in influencing public policy, but they still provide a forum for migrant workers to
organize and articulate their grievances. These NGOs have become substitutes for official trade
unions that exclude migrant workers. These trade unions have been criticized as inefficient and
a weak means of representation, suggesting that migrant workers have an advantage in terms
of organization. However, these NGOs must work under the limitations set by the government,
which restricts their efficacy to very specific issues in these two cities. Ultimately, non-

governmental organizations are not an ideal vehicle for changes in public policy."*° Migrants

48 Roulleau-Berger 4.
“8 National Office of Humanitarian Organization Management, "2008 Niandu Fendiqu Shehuizuzhi Tongji Shuju
(2008 Report on Local-level Humanitarian Organizations Statistics]," National Office of Humanitarian Organization
Management, March 18, 2010.
http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=42812&dictionid=2201&catid (accessed March 21, 2011)

Eroissart, Chloé, "NGOs Providing Support to Migrant Workers in China," Power to the People? (Con-)Tested Civil
Society in Search of Democracy, Heidi Moksnes and Mia Melin, Uppsala: Hallvigs (2010) 183.
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themselves have been reasonably successful in self-organizing because of the strong role that
family and hometown relationships play in migrant life. A majority of migrants claim to rely on
kinsman for support when local governments fail to provide adequate social services.

Ultimately, these informal associations of migrant workers may be more influential than NGOs

as they provide a stronger voice to represent migrant interests."
Migrants Today

The underlying issues surrounding migrant worker’s status within China’s cities are
economic in nature; China was faced with a rural labor surplus and an urban labor shortage
following the economic reforms of the 1970s, and waves of migration have moved China
towards equilibrium. However, the labor shortage that has plagued urban China over the past
year suggests that unfavorable political conditions for migrants have slowed the natural labor
flow from the countryside to the city. Analysts argue that there is likely a causative relationship

between the continued exclusion of migrant workers and the increasingly serious labor
shortage. This suggests that political liberalizations will be necessary to continue urban China’s

migrant-fueled economic growth. As a result, market forces will arm migrant workers with
greater leverage over how they are treated and compensate.’

This thesis has focused primarily on the political and social improvements to migrants’
status. As migrant workers have gained more economic leverage and intend to live in these
cities long-term, the municipal governments of Shanghai and Suzhou have liberalized policies

that affect migrants.

Residence permits that were once unobtainable for all but the most

** Mallee 98.
®. Deng Fengtian 1.
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ducated migrants have been replaced or de-emphasized in both cities, and even migrants who
e
i

email entirely undocumented have opportunities to send their children to city-run schools
.

the public perception of migrants in these two cities has also seen improvement since the
1990s as leading newspapers in these two cities have begun expressing an explicit editorial

view that migrants ought to be better protected. Though migrant workers and their families in
Shanghai and Suzhou still face barriers to full political and social inclusion, they have moved

closer to obtaining the urban ideal of Chinese citizenship.
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